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Abstract— With the advancement of technology in the last few 
decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized 
sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic 
devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack (SCA) is 
one of the prominent methods to break the security of an 
encryption system by exploiting the information leaked from the 
physical devices. Correlational power attack (CPA) is an efficient 
power side-channel attack technique, which analyses the 
correlation between the estimated and measured supply current 
traces to extract the secret key. The existing countermeasures to 
the power attacks are mainly based on reducing the SNR of the 
leaked data, or introducing large overhead using techniques like 
power balancing. This paper presents an attenuated signature AES 
(AS-AES), which resists SCA with minimal noise current 
overhead. AS-AES uses a shunt low-drop-out (LDO) regulator to 
suppress the AES current signature by	૝૙૙ in the supply current 
traces. The shunt LDO has been fabricated and validated in 130 
nm CMOS technology. System-level implementation of the AS-
AES along with noise injection, shows that the system remains 
secure even after ૞૙ࡷ encryptions, with ૚૙ reduction in power 
overhead compared to that of noise addition alone. 
Keywords— Side Channel Attack (SCA), Cryptographic 
Hardware, Power Analysis Attack, Countermeasure, Attenuated 
Signature AES, Shunt LDO, Noise Injection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid proliferation of mobile devices and wireless 
communications has enhanced the need for stronger encryption 
algorithms. However, hardware implementations of these 
computationally-secure cryptographic algorithms provide 
sufficient “side-channel” information for the attackers to 
decipher the secret key. Side-channels include power 
consumption [1], [2], electromagnetic emanations [3], [4], 
acoustic vibrations [5], or the timing of various encryption 
operations [6], [7]. 
A. Motivation 
For an attacker, the power monitoring attack is one of the 
most common side-channel attacks on modern computer 
systems. The attacker measures the power consumption of the 
encryption device under test (DUT), and performs subsequent 
simple (SPA) [8] or differential power analysis (DPA) [1] of 
the obtained traces to decipher the secret key. 
In this article, we focus on the correlational power analysis 
(CPA) attack [9] on a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) engine. However, the proposed AS-AES is a generic 
technique to resist power attacks, and can be applied to other 
encryption algorithms. Figure 1 gives an overview of the 
proposed signature attenuating AES (AS-AES). The underlying 
idea is to embed the AES in a signature attenuating hardware, 
such that the variations in the AES current is highly suppressed 
and is not reflected in the supply current traces, thereby 
requiring much lower noise current injection to decorrelate the 
measured supply traces. 
B. Contribution 
This paper proposes a new hardware-based technique for 
cryptographic devices to resist power analysis attacks (PAA). 
Specific contributions of this paper are: 
 Demonstrated the relation between only noise injection vs. 
correlation (for CPA with correct key), both 
mathematically and through simulation results. This 
highlighted the inefficiency of only noise injection leading 
to a 370%  power overhead requirement for achieving 
Minimum Traces to Disclosure (MTD)൐ 50ܭ. 
 Proposed a new generic DPA/CPA countermeasure that 
can be applied to any cryptographic algorithm. This is 
achieved by embedding the cryptographic engine within a 
high-efficiency signature attenuation hardware, to reduce 
(൐ 400) the secret signature on power pin. Injection of 
noise to mask SCA in the Attenuated-Signature AES (AS-
AES) domain, reduces noise-injection overhead ሺ~1	݉ܣሻ 
for SCA immunity by 70, compared to standalone noise 
injection.  
 Demonstrated that with the proposed AS-AES, none of its 
secret key blocks have been disclosed (ܯܶܦ ൐ 50ܭ) with 
Figure 1: Traditional AES and Proposed AS-AES with noise injection: A 
comparative Overview (IOv: overhead current) 
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൐ 10 lower power overhead compared to parallel noise 
incorporation.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Immunity to power analysis attack could be improved by 
modifying the encryption hardware module such that the power 
consumption of the device is independent of the signal 
transitions. The existing protection schemes for the hardware 
encryption engines against power analysis attacks can be 
classified into three major categories. The first category reduces 
the SNR of the leaked information by injecting noise into the 
supply traces [10]. However, solely noise addition is not an 
optimum technique to make a power attack infeasible. A 
statistical analysis for this technique is presented in Section III. 
Also, the effect of power delivery network (PDN) on SNR has 
been studied and a frequency-dependent noise injection circuit 
was implemented by Wang et al. [11]. 
The second category reduces side-channel leakage by 
balancing the power consumption of the rising and falling 
transitions. Power balancing logic implementations include the 
sense-amplifier based logic (SABL) [12], dual-rail circuits [13], 
[14], and wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) [15]. The 
WDDL structure appears to be the first power attack resistant 
power-balancing circuit validated in silicon with a 
Measurements to Disclosure (MTD) of ~21K. However, the 
increased protection consumed 4 power overhead, 3 area, 
and a 4 performance degradation. 
The third category of protection reduces the power side-
channel leakage information by isolating the supply from the 
encryption engine. It includes switched capacitor techniques 
[16], [17], [18] and integrated voltage regulator (IVR) based 
implementations [19], [20], [21], [22]. The switched capacitor 
current equalizer module proposed by Tokunaga et al. [17] 
demonstrated Power SCA immunity, however, it resulted in 2 
performance degradation and 33%  power overhead. The 
impact of package parasitic and integrated buck converters on 
power SCA vulnerability have been analyzed in  [11], [19]. 
Another concept is to degrade the performance of IVR such that 
supply current has lesser correlation with the AES current. 
Implementations of this concept could be found using Analog 
LDO [20], Digital LDO (resolution is traded off, droop 
increases) [21] and a buck converter [22]. The above described 
techniques exhibit a fundamental trade-off between system 
performance (e.g. dynamic loop response) and reduction in 
side-channel vulnerability. 
In this work, the proposed AS-AES effectively combines the 
first and third categories of protection to achieve SCA 
immunity with high power efficiency and no performance 
degradation. Figure 2 shows a block diagram representing the 
CPA attack on the AES engine of the device under attack 
(DUT). The traditional AES-128 core revealed one byte (1st 
byte in this example) of the secret key with only 1ܭ  traces, 
while the same attack applied to the modified AS-AES core 
could not extract the key byte even with 50ܭ traces. 
III. POWER SIDE-CHANNEL IMMUNITY USING NOISE INSERTION 
Noise injection into power consumption measurements is a 
convenient approach to defend against power side-channel 
attacks [23]. The correlation ሺߩ்ுሻ  between the estimated 
hamming weight matrix (H) and the obtained power traces (T) 
can be given as, 
ߩ்ு ൌ 	ܥ݋ݒ	
ሺܶ, ܪሻ
ߪ் ∗ ߪு 	 
where, Cov denotes the covariance matrix, and 
ߪ்,ߪு	,represents the standard deviation of T and H respectively. 
Now, the main goal is to add enough random noise to resist a 
side-channel attack, yet introducing a minimal power overhead 
in the system. If N denotes the amount of random noise added 
into the circuit, and ܶᇱ ൌ ܶ ൅ ܰ denote the modified traces, the 
modified correlation factor ߩ்ᇱு can be written as, 
																						ߩ்′ு ൌ 	
ܥ݋ݒሺܶ ൅ ܰ,ܪሻ
ߪ்ାே ∗ ߪு 	
ൌ 	ܧሾሺܶ ൅ ܰሻ ∗ ܪሿ െ ܧሺܶ ൅ ܰሻܧሺܪሻඥܧሺܶ ൅ ܰሻଶ െ ܧଶሺܶ ൅ ܰሻ ∗ ߪு
ൌ ܧሾܶ ∗ ܪሿ െ ܧሺܶሻܧሺܪሻඥܧሺܶሻଶ ൅ ܧሺܰሻଶ െ ܧଶሺܶሻ െ ܧଶሺܰሻ ∗ ߪு
ൌ 	 ܥ݋ݒሺܶ, ܪሻඥߪଶ் ൅ ߪேଶ ∗ ߪு
 
ܧ represents the expectation or mean of the corresponding 
variable. The independence of the variables N and H has been 
utilized in this expression. Thus, we see that, higher is its 
 
Figure 3(a, b): Effect of Noise insertion alone, on current overhead for power 
SCA immunity 
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Figure 2: Power Side-Channel attack on unprotected 128-bit AES 
variance ߪேଶ, and lower is the correlation ߩ்ᇲு. However, noise 
insertion alone introduces a significant current overhead. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of noise insertion on power attack 
(PAA) immunity. It can be seen that for the actual key, the 
traces correlate in absence of noise (ߩ்ᇲு	~	0.9). For the AES- 
128 core under attack, the average current consumption of the 
sampled traces during the AES operations was found to be 
~18.89 mA. In order to provide high enough resistance to a DPA 
or CPA, noise insertion requires a current overhead of ~70	݉ܣ 
(refer MTD plots in Figure 12 (a-d)), which incurs a current 
overhead of approximately four times ሺ370%ሻ of the average 
AES current consumption. Thus, only noise insertion is not an 
optimized solution for power SCA immunity. 
IV. PROPOSED ATTENUATED SIGNATURE AES (AS-AES) 
In this section, we introduce the attenuated signature AES 
(AS-AES) with noise injection. The proposed AS-AES 
architecture (Figure 4) incorporates a shunt LDO, and an 
integrating load capacitor. As discussed earlier, to remove the 
correlation spikes for the actual key, the supply current needs 
to be independent of the AES current. As seen from Figure 4, 
the voltage across AES block ( ௥ܸ௘௚) needs to be regulated at a 
constant value, with minimum power overhead. Traditional 
LDOs, which are commonplace in ICs, aim to maintain a 
constant ௥ܸ௘௚, however, the supply current reflects the changes 
in load (e.g. AES) current. In our design, the goal is to maintain 
a constant ௥ܸ௘௚ , as well as to make the supply current 
independent of the AES current during encryption operations. 
A. Operation Principle 
 The proposed AS-AES operates using two control loops. 
Switched-mode control (SMC) is implemented using a low 
bandwidth slow loop to track large changes in the average AES 
current. The concept of SMC has been demonstrated in [24]. 
The SMC loop (Figure 5) regulates the current through an array 
of PMOS current sources, which are activated when the output 
voltage goes beyond ௧ܸ௔௥௚௘௧	 . Here acts as a guard-band 
and prevents the digitally controlled loop from being 
continuously ON. As soon as the output voltage is within the 
digital loop is gated and the analog shunt regulator takes the 
output voltage to ௥ܸ௘௚. For the AES-core under attack, it was 
verified that the average current ሺ~18.89	݉ܣ) consumed by 
the AES engine for different inputs remain almost the same 
throughout the encryption operations, as it performs repetitive 
ten S-box operations for each input byte.  SMC only engages to 
compensate for slow changes in the average AES current. Due 
to the almost-constant nature of the average AES current, the 
SMC loop stays disengaged and the PMOS (Figure 4) acts as a 
current source (CS), in saturation, with high drain to source 
impedance (ݎௗ௦). 
Once the SMC loop is set, the CS current is fixed at a value 
higher ( ܫ஼ௌ ൌ ܫ஺ாௌೌೡ೒ ൅ ܫ௢௩ ) than the average load (AES 
current). The fast loop incorporates a shunt LDO with a NMOS 
bleed to sink any excess current from the supply, when the AES 
current consumption is lower than the average. Thus, the bleed 
restricts unnecessary charging of the load capacitor (ܥ௅௢௔ௗ), and 
thereby regulates the output voltage ( ௥ܸ௘௚). On the other hand, 
when the AES current requirement is more than the supply 
current, the capacitor provides the necessary extra current, 
thereby maintaining a constant supply current irrespective of 
the AES current variation, at the expense of an instantaneous 
droop in ௥ܸ௘௚, which is reduced with increased ܥ௅௢௔ௗ or ܫ௢௩.  
B. Steady State Analysis of the AS-AES  
The parameters involved in the design of the fast control 
loop (steady state) of the AS-AES are the NMOS bleed size, the 
choice of integrating load capacitor, gain (ܣ௩) and bandwidth 
of the operational amplifier (OP-AMP) in the shunt-LDO loop 
Figure 4: Proposed AS-AES architecture with noise injection to defend against
power side-channel attacks 
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Figure 5: Block diagram of the SMC loop with shunt LDO in AS-AES 
Figure 6: Snapshot of the time-domain waveforms of the AS-AES 
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(Figure 4). When the transistors are properly biased into 
saturation and considering steady state operation, the small-
signal analysis of the AS-AES can be performed (Figure 7(a)). 
The small-signal analysis is shown as follows: 
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where, AF is the AES signature attenuation factor; ݃௠ and ܽ 
represents the transconductance and the dominant pole of the 
OP-AMP, respectively. Figure 8 shows the magnitude Bode 
plot of the attenuation factor (AF) with nominal design, along 
with its effect on different key parameters. AF increases as loop 
gain (ܩ௠ ) is increased. Increasing ܽ  (i.e. shunt LDO loop 
bandwidth) increases the rejection range. Higher ܥ௟௢௔ௗ helps 
with high frequency rejection. In general, the important point to 
note from these analysis is that for all cases, AS-AES provides 
high attenuation of AES signature current to supply current. 
  Ideally, if the integrating capacitor is high enough, so as to 
deliver any excess current drawn by the AES, and if the bleed 
transistor is strong enough to sink any extra current, and the 
shunt LDO loop bandwidth is very high, the droop in the output 
voltage ௥ܸ௘௚ would be negligible. However, bandwidth of the 
fast loop is limited due to the presence of a non-dominant pole 
at the gate of the bleed NMOS. Also, the choice of capacitor 
has a trade-off with the area. The choice of the optimized design 
parameters are discussed in Section V. 
Figure 6 shows the time-domain waveforms of the AS-AES 
during an encryption operation. It can be seen that when the 
AES current goes low, the bleed sinks the excess current, not 
allowing the load capacitor to charge up, and thereby 
maintaining a constant ௥ܸ௘௚ . Output voltage ( ௥ܸ௘௚ ) with low 
ripples ensure that the AES current variation is sufficiently 
suppressed in the supply current. When the AES current is high, 
bleed provides the current until it runs out range. When the 
bleed device turns off, the load capacitor delivers the required 
current, thereby maintaining the supply current at a constant 
value, however causing a small droop. In Figure 6, an average 
droop of ~10	ܸ݉ in ௥ܸ௘௚ can be observed whenever the AES 
current shows a rising spike, using a 450 pF integrating 
capacitor. High output resistance (ݎௗ௦) of the PMOS minimizes 
supply current variations caused by the signature of the small 
௥ܸ௘௚variations. Since an ideal constant current source (with 
infinite impedance) is not practical, a finite ݎௗ௦  would still 
reflect the relative change in voltage ௥ܸ௘௚ in the supply current, 
however, it will be highly attenuated. AS-AES achieves the 
AES current signature attenuation of >400  in the supply 
current. 
C. Noise Injection on AS-AES 
 The peak-to-peak variation in the supply current with 
different ݎௗ௦	of the current source PMOS is shown in Figure 
7(b). Even designing a current source with output resistance in 
the order of ܯΩ would reflect a variation in the order of ݊ܣ, 
which can still be measured using an oscilloscope. Thus, a 
change in AES current in the order of ݉ܣ gets reflected in the 
supply current in an attenuated scale of the order few μܣ , 
depending on the impedance of the current source. Although 
the signature gets attenuated, the change in current will still be 
reflected in the power supply traces, and it cannot yet resist a 
CPA attack completely, resulting in some correlational peaks. 
Note, though the signature is still present it is highly 
attenuated. A small amount of random noise current is injected 
(as shown in Figure 4) in order to decorrelate the traces with the 
estimated hamming weight matrix, and thereby provide 
significant immunity against CPA attack. The noise current 
generation circuit is a simple linear feedback shift register 
 
Figure 9: Proof-of-concept shunt LDO design measured on a 130nm testchip. 
Die-photo, key measurement results and the shunt LDO circuit is shown 
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Figure 7: (a) Small-signal model of the AS-AES; (b) Effect of output resistance
of the current source on supply current variation (Log-Log scale) 
 
 
Figure 8: Magnitude Bode plot for attenuation factor (AF) of the AS-AES 
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(LFSR) with a current-steering DAC. This noise overhead is 
very minimal compared to the ‘only noise’ addition technique, 
and depends on the output resistance of the current source 
PMOS, and small signal variation present in ௥ܸ௘௚ . Thus, the 
total current overhead includes the current consumed by the 
shunt LDO and the noise overhead. 
D. Shunt LDO Design and Validation 
The feasibility of a linear regulator featuring SMC and shunt 
regulation has been shown in Figure 9. A proof-of-concept 
design has been fabricated in the GF 130 nm CMOS 
technology. The digital control loop allows large signal control 
of the input current and is activated when the output voltage 
goes beyond ௧ܸ௔௥௚௘௧	 . The shunt analog regulator is a two 
stage design with an operational transconductance amplifier 
(OTA) based first stage and a shunt feedback buffer based 
second stage. In the current test-chip, mV has been 
chosen. The shunt (bleed) path is designed to consume 5% to 
40% of the load (AES) current and provide regulation. The 
phase margin in the worst case load condition is 88O. A 
summary of the measurements on the test-chip is also shown. 
Peak current efficiency of 90% is measured. This measured 
line regulation is less than 10	ܸ݉/ܸ. This design illustrates the 
concept of an SMC based shunt LDO and the capability of the 
design to provide regulation across a load range. 
V. RESULTS 
A. CPA attack on the AES-128 core 
 We perform CPA attack on the AES-128 power traces. 
Figure 10(a) shows the correlational peaks for the actual key 
when the unprotected AES was subjected to CPA attack (< 1ܭ 
traces). The same attack on modified AES (AS-AES) does not 
reveal the secret key, highlighting the SCA immunity (Figure 
10(b)).  
B. Design Space Exploration 
Figure 10(c,d) and Figure 11(a-d) show the choice of 
parameters for the AS-AES design. Figure 10(c) shows that, as 
the supply current (ICS) is increased (i.e. the overhead/bleed 
current is increased), the required noise current (overhead) 
reduces. However, ܫ஼ௌ  of 20	݉ܣ  is sufficient for ܫ஺ாௌೌೡ೒ of 
18.89	݉ܣ (Figure 10(d)), as it reduces correlation significantly 
with minimum current overhead. Now, ܫ௢௩ ൌ ܫ௕௟௘௘ௗ ൅ ܫ௡௢௜௦௘ ൅ܫ௢௣௔௠௣ . Considering ܫ஼ௌ  = 20	݉ܣ , ܫ௕௟௘௘ௗ = ܫ஼ௌ	 െ ܫ஺ாௌೌೡ೒	 ~ 
1.1	݉ܣ.  Hence, the bleed should be designed to have a 
minimum current sink capacity of 1.1	݉ܣ. However, higher 
bleed capacity increases the current overhead, and hence should 
be optimized. Figure 11(a, b) justifies that the bleed current sink 
capacity of ≤	3	݉ܣ would be an optimal choice in terms of the 
noise injection and ܫ௢௩, since higher bleed would not reduce the 
correlation any further, but increase the ܫ௢௩ , which is not 
desired. Figure 11(c) shows that the overhead current can be 
lowered with higher load capacitance. However, considering its 
trade-off with area and the current overhead, 450 ݌ܨ  load 
capacitance is chosen over 1 ݊ܨ. Figure 11(d) shows that higher 
output resistance (ݎௗ௦  = 1	ܯΩ) of the PMOS current source 
allows lower noise current overhead and thus the total overhead 
current is reduced. Figure 11(e) shows that increasing the 
supply ஽ܸ஽  (i.e. the dropout in the LDO, increasing ݎௗ௦ ) 
increases the power overhead ( ௢ܲ௩), as ௥ܸ௘௚ is maintained at a 
particular voltage (1	ܸ in our case). 
The above results were obtained with 1000 traces, and gives 
a good sense of the choice of design parameters and its effects. 
To confirm the exact overheads and efficiency required, the 
CPA attack is run over significantly more traces. As the number 
of traces analyzed is increased, the correlation coefficients (ߩ) 
are expected to be more accurate, and ߩ for the correct key 
should be consistently higher than the ߩ of the peak (absolute 
maximum) correlation of the incorrect keys. 
C. SCA Immunity Verification with MTD Analysis 
 Figure 12(a-d) (noise addition alone) and Figure 12(e-h) 
(AS-AES + noise injection) shows the evolution of the 
correlation coefficient as the number of encryption run 
increases for different noise injection. Figure 12 (a-d) shows 
that noise addition alone, involves an overhead of 70 ݉ܣ to 
achieve Measurements to Disclosure (MTD) >50ܭ. As the AS-
AES core is subjected to a CPA attack, it is seen that MTD 
Figure 10: (a, b): CPA attack on traditional and modified AES (with noise addition) respectively, for the actual key; (c, d): Effect of PMOS source current on the 
overhead current required to provide immunity against power SCA. 
 
Figure 11: Effect of design parameters on the noise and total overhead current/power required for high power attack immunity. (a, b): Bleed current sink capacity; (c) 
Load capacitance; (d) PMOS current source output resistance ሺݎௗ௦ሻ; (e) Supply voltage ሺ ஽ܸ஽ ሻ 
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>50ܭ  is achieved, with only a noise current injection of 1	݉ܣ 
(Figure 12(h)). Also, the current consumed by the OP-AMP is 
400	μܣ . Hence, the total overhead current (as discussed 
previously) is ܫ௢௩ ൌ ܫ௕௟௘௘ௗ ൅ ܫ௡௢௜௦௘ ൅ ܫ௢௣௔௠௣ =  1.11	݉ܣ  + 
1	݉ܣ + 0.4	݉ܣ = 2.51	݉ܣ, which is 28 lower than that of 
noise addition alone. The total overhead power for the AS-AES 
architecture isሺ20	݉ܣ+1	݉ܣ ൅ 0.4	݉ܣሻ ∗ 1.2	ܸ– 18.89	݉ܣ ∗
1	ܸ ൌ 6.79	ܹ݉. In case of solely noise insertion the power 
overhead required is ௢ܲ௩ ൌ 70	݉ܣ ∗ 1	ܸ ൌ 70	ܹ݉. Thus, AS-
AES along with noise injection provides ൐ 10 improvement 
in the power overhead for iso-SCA immunity, compared to only 
noise addition, with ܯܶܦ	 ൐ 	50ܭ. Power efficiency for AS-
AES is given as, ߟ ൌ ଵ଼.଼ଽ	௠஺∗ଵ	௏ଶଵ.ସ	௠஺∗ଵ.ଶ	௏ ∗ 100	 ൌ 	73.56	% (includes 
noise overhead). Hence, AS-AES consumes similar overhead 
as [17], but does not incur the performance penalty.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Power Side Channel Attack is a prominent attack on 
cryptographic ICs. This work proposes low-overhead hardware 
modification that attenuates critical AES signature (AS) by ൐
400   in the supply current which the attackers could observe 
from the periphery of an encryption ASIC. Noise injection in 
the AS domain achieves SCA immunity with extremely high-
efficiency. Successful SCA immunity is demonstrated for a 
CPA side-channel attack, with up to 50	ܭ traces. Power SCA 
immunity is achieved with 73.56	% power efficiency, and 10 
lower power overhead, compared to only noise addition and 
more importantly without imposing any performance penalty. 
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Figure 12: (a-d) MTD plots for only noise addition on traditional AES; (e-h): MTD plots for noise injection on AS-AES. 
